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Abstract
We show that logic C1 cannot be extended to a paraconsistent logic in which the substitution theorem is
valid. We show that C1 can be extended to larger paraconsistent logics by adding some desirable properties
as axioms. We use three-valued logics to support our claims.
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1 Introduction
Two main approaches are common to deﬁne a logic, the Hilbert axiomatic system
and the use of multi-valued tables that deﬁne the connectives of the logic. In the
ﬁrst approach the validity of a formula is determined by a set of axioms and a family
of inference rules, namely, if the formula can be derived from those axioms and the
use of the inference rules, then the formula is valid, otherwise it is not valid. In
general, there are many ways of choosing the family of axioms to deﬁne a logic and
Modus Ponens is one of the most common inference rules appearing in the deﬁnition
of logics. In the second approach, the tables used to deﬁne the logic are called truth
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tables, each connective is regarded as a function taking values in a set of numbers
(usually integers) that are speciﬁed from the beginning and are called truth values.
Some of the values are chosen as designated values. Any formula that evaluates
to one of the designated values regardless of the truth values taken by the atoms
that appear in the formula, is considered valid. In this paper, we combine both
approaches.
In logic, as in any other area of mathematics, when choosing a family of ax-
ioms to deﬁne a logic, it is desirable to have independence of the axioms, that is,
any formula chosen as an axiom should be independent from the other axioms.
Multi-valued logics can be used for this purpose (see an example of this in [14]).
This methodology sometimes can have limitations (see [10]), however it is useful to
researchers interested in the study of logics, such as in our case.
One of the properties we are particularly interested in is paraconsistency. Fol-
lowing Be´ziau [2], a logic is paraconsistent if it has a negation ¬, which is paracon-
sistent in the sense that the formula a,¬a  b is not valid, and at the same time has
enough strong properties to be called a negation. Paraconsistent logics have im-
portant applications, speciﬁcally [7] mentions three applications in diﬀerent ﬁelds:
Mathematics, Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Philosophy. In relation to the second one,
the authors mention that in certain domains, such as the construction of expert
systems, the presence of inconsistencies is almost unavoidable (see for example [9]).
An application that has not been fully recognized is the use of paraconsistent logics
in non-monotonic reasoning. In this sense [21,20] illustrate such novel applications.
One example where intuition indicates that paraconsistent logics would be use-
ful for describing abstract structures is provided by Birkhoﬀ and Von Neumann’s
approach to quantum logic [5].
We emphasize the convenience of accepting local inconsistencies by mentioning
Minsky’s comment 4 [15]: “But I do not believe that consistency is necessary or
even desirable in a developing intelligent system. No one is ever completely consis-
tent. What is important is how one handles paradox or conﬂict, how one learns from
mistakes, how one turns aside from suspected inconsistencies”. We think that para-
consistent logics could help to give an answer to this important issue addressed by
Minsky. In fact, in [16] an interesting approach for Knowledge Representation (KR)
was proposed. This approach can be supported by any paraconsistent logic stronger
than or equal to Cω, the weakest paraconsistent logic introduced by Da Costa [8].
Therefore we must consider paraconsistent logics as a supplement to classi-
cal logic that deviates from it only in some of its principles (mainly the non-
contradiction principle) but that might be applied to contradictory or inconsistent
systems like those caused by vagueness or empirical theories whose postulates or
basic assumptions are contradictory [5].
Thus, the research on paraconsistent logics is far from being over and, in this
work we focus our attention on the paraconsistent logic C1, which has been studied
in [12].
4 “Minsky’s Frame paper” (1975) in its original form had an appendix entitled “Criticism of the Logistic
approach”
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As mentioned before the applications of paraconsistency can be done by using
any paraconsistent logic stronger than Cω. There are many of such logics and
their particular properties depend on which properties that are valid in Classical
Logic they preserve. The reason to study C1 is not just because the applications of
its paraconsistency, but also because of the theoretical value in terms of studying
possible ways of approaching Classical Logic while preserving paraconsistency.
In this paper we present two results, ﬁrst we show that there is no paraconsistent
logic that extends C1 and for which the substitution theorem holds. Second we
extend C1 to larger paraconsistent logics by adding diﬀerent axioms to the family
of axioms that deﬁne it. Each of such axioms is a formula valid in Classical logic, so
that by adding them, the logics we obtain are paraconsistent but at the same time
closer to classical logic. For each of these extensions we present the tables of one
or more three-valued logics that guarantee that each axiom added is independent
of the axioms of C1 and that the logic obtained is paraconsistent.
Our paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we summarize some basic
concepts and deﬁnitions. In section 3, we show our results. Finally, in section 4, we
present some conclusions.
1.1 Contribution
We can think of certain properties or theorems of classical logic that would enrich
the scope of any paraconsistent logic. Some of this properties are: the De Morgan
laws, the necessitation rule (if α is a theorem then ¬¬α is a theorem), the week
explosion principle: ¬α → (¬¬α → β), the weak contrapositive: (¬α → ¬β) ↔
(¬¬β → ¬¬α), and double negation equivalence: α ↔ ¬¬α.
In this work we study the relation of logic C1 with some of this properties after
showing that C1 can not be extended to a paraconsistent logic where the substitution
property holds.
2 Background
There are two ways to deﬁne a logic: by giving a set of axioms and specifying a set of
inference rules; and by the use of truth values and interpretations. In this section we
summarize each of them and we present some basic concepts and deﬁnitions useful
to understand this paper. From here on, when we refer to any logic, we understand
that the only primitive connectives are ∧, ∨, →, ¬ and the biconditional ↔ that is
an abbreviation of (A → B) ∧ (B → A).
2.1 Hilbert style
In Hilbert style proof systems, also known as axiomatic systems, a logic is speciﬁed
by giving a set of axioms and a set of inference rules. In these systems, it is common
to use the notation X F for provability of a logic formula F in the logic X. In
that case we say that F is a theorem of X.
We say that a logic X is paraconsistent if the formula (A ∧ ¬A) → B is not a
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Pos1: A→ (B → A) Cω1: A ∨ ¬A
Pos2: (A→ (B → C))→ ((A→ B)→ (A→ C)) Cω2: ¬¬A→ A
Pos3: A ∧B → A
Pos4: A ∧B → B
Pos5: A→ (B → (A ∧B))
Pos6: A→ (A ∨ B)
Pos7: B → (A ∨ B)
Pos8: (A→ C)→ ((B → C)→ (A ∨ B → C))
Table 1
Axiomatization of Cω .
theorem 5 . The relevance of logics for which the formula (A ∧ ¬A) → B is not a
theorem, is that they are useful to deﬁne alternative semantics that can be applied
in the study of non monotonic reasoning as we mentioned in the introduction.
A very important property satisﬁed by many logics is the substitution theorem
which we present now.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A logic X satisﬁes the substitution property if: Γ X α ↔ β then
Γ X Ψ[α/p] ↔ Ψ[β/p] for any formulas α, β, and Ψ and any atom p that appear
in Ψ where Ψ[α/p] denotes the resulting formula that is left after every occurrence
of p is substituted by the formula α.
As examples of axiomatic systems, we present two logics: the positive logic [17]
and the Cω logic which is a paraconsistent logic deﬁned by daCosta [8]. In Table 1
we present a list of axioms, the ﬁrst eight of them deﬁne positive logic. Cω logic is
deﬁned by the axioms of positive logic plus axioms Cω1 and Cω2.
2.2 Multi-valued logics
An alternative way to deﬁne a logic is by the use of truth values and interpretations.
Multi-valued logics generalize the idea of using truth tables to determine the validity
of formulas in classical logic. The core of a multi-valued logic is its domain of values
D, where some of such values are special and identiﬁed as designated or select
values. Logic connectives (e.g. ∧, ∨, →, ¬) are then introduced as operators over
D according to the particular deﬁnition of the logic, see [14].
An interpretation is a function I : L → D that maps atoms to elements in the
domain. The application of I is then extended to arbitrary formulas by mapping
ﬁrst the atoms to values in D, and then evaluating the resulting expression in terms
of the connectives of the logic (which are deﬁned over D). It is understood in
general that, if I is an interpretation deﬁned on the arbitrary formulas of a given
program P , then I(P ) is deﬁned as the function I applied to the conjunction of all
the formulas in P . A formula F is said to be a tautology, denoted usually by |= F
if, for every possible interpretation, the formula F evaluates to a designated value.
The simplest example of a multi-valued logic is classical logic where: D = {0, 1}, 1
5 For any logic X that contains Pos1 and Pos2 (axioms of positive logic deﬁned in Table 1) among its
axioms and Modus Ponens as its unique inference rule, the formula (A ∧¬A) → B is a theorem if and only
if A,¬A X B.
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∧ 0 1 2
0 0 0 0
1 0 2 2
2 0 2 2
∨ 0 1 2
0 0 2 2
1 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
→ 0 1 2
0 2 2 2
1 0 2 2
2 0 2 2
x ¬x
0 2
1 1
2 0
Table 2
Truth tables of connectives ∧, ∨, →, and ¬ in P2.
is the unique designated value, and the connectives are deﬁned through the usual
basic truth tables.
Note that in a multi-valued logic, so that it can truly be a logic, the implication
connective has to satisfy the following property: for any given value x ∈ D, and for
every designated value y ∈ D such that y → x is designated, then x must also be
a designated value. This restriction enforces the validity of Modus Ponens in the
logic.
As an example of a multi-valued logic, we present the well known paraconsistent
logic P2 [4] (also called Cive).
The truth values of logic P2 are in the domain D = {0, 1, 2} where 1 and 2 are
the designated values. The ∧, ∨, →, and ¬ connectives are deﬁned according to the
truth tables given in Table 2.
2.3 C1 logic
C1 is a paraconsistent logic deﬁned by Be´ziau [12]. It is deﬁned by the axioms of
Cω plus the following axioms:
¬1 : B
◦ → ((A→B)→ ((A→¬B)→¬A))
¬2 : A
◦ ∧B◦ → (A ∧B)◦ ∧ (A ∨B)◦ ∧ (A→B)◦
where B◦ = ¬(B ∧ ¬B). We observe that formula ¬1 makes valid reductio ad
absurdum whenever B satisﬁes the principle of non contradiction.
• De Morgan law ¬(A ∧B) → (¬A ∨ ¬B) is a theorem in C1 [11].
• ¬A ∨A◦ is a theorem in C1 [11].
• A◦◦ is a theorem in C1 [6].
• If we replace the axiom ¬2 in C1 by the following stronger axiom, called ¬3, then
we obtain logic C+1 [12], a paraconsistent logic that extends C1:
¬3 : A
◦ ∨B◦ → (A ∧B)◦ ∧ (A ∨B)◦ ∧ (A→B)◦
• We deﬁne the strong negation as ¬∗ = ¬α ∧ α◦. The connectives →, ∧, ∨, and
¬∗ satisfy all schemas and inference rules of classical propositional calculus [6].
Then, we can say the classical propositional calculus is contained in C1, and at
the same time C1 is a subcalculus of it.
As we know, paraconsistent logics have been used as a tool in knowledge represen-
tation due to the fact that they allow local inconsistencies without being explosive,
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i.e., they accept formulas like α and ¬α as theorems without becoming explosive in
the sense that every formula becomes a theorem, that is, the formula α ∧ ¬α → β
is not valid in the paraconsistent logic.
According to some authors [1], a paraconsistent logic should retain as much
of classical logic, but must allow non-trivial inconsistent theories. Also, it should
not validate any inference which is not valid in classical logic. Then, it should be
contained in classical logic.
According to some of the facts mentioned before, we obtain an increasing se-
quence of paraconsistent logics
Cω ⊂ C1 ⊂ C
+
1 ⊂ Cive
where Cive is deﬁned by the axioms of Cω plus the next three formulas as axioms:
¬1 : B
◦ → ((A→B)→ ((A→¬B)→¬A))
A → ¬¬A
(A ∧B)◦ ∧ (A ∨B)◦ ∧ (A→B)◦
Cive is an axiomatization of P2, the tautologies of P2 are the theorems of cive
and vice-versa [13].
3 Main contribution
An interesting theoretical question that arises in the study of logics is whether a
given logic satisﬁes the substitution theorem [22]. It is well known that there are
several paraconsistent logics for which that theorem is not valid [3]. We show that
logic C1 can not be extended to a paraconsistent logic in which the substitution
theorem is valid. Then we will explore the relation between C1 and the De Morgan
laws. Since one of our purposes is to extend C1 to other paraconsistent logics,
in what follows, whenever we provide a three-valued logic, it will be such that
the formula (A ∧ ¬A) → B is not a tautology, and also will have the following
property: if A and A → B evaluate both to designated values then B must also
evaluate to a designated value. These two conditions guarantee that the extensions
we are deﬁning are paraconsistent and sound with respect to this three-valued logic.
Besides we will need to deﬁne two three-valued logics for each axiom we add, in one
of them the new axiom must be a tautology and in the other one must be not a
tautology, this is to guarantee that the new axiom is independent of the family of
axioms that deﬁne C1.
The ﬁrst result of our paper is that C1 can not be extended to a paraconsistent
logic in which the substitution theorem holds. In order to do this, we provide a
deﬁnition and a theorem.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A logic X satisﬁes the weak substitution property if: Γ X A ↔ B
then Γ X ¬A ↔ ¬B.
Next theorem is presented in [18] in a slightly diﬀerent form. Their proofs are
similar.
M. Osorio et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 315 (2015) 47–6052
Theorem 3.2 Any logic stronger than Cω satisﬁes the weak substitution property
iﬀ satisﬁes the substitution property.
Theorem 3.3 Any extension of logic C1 to a logic where the substitution theorem
holds, is not paraconsistent.
Proof.
It is easy to see that a,¬a  (a ∧ ¬a) ↔ a.
By substitution theorem we have a,¬a  ¬(a ∧ ¬a) ↔ ¬a,
but a,¬a  ¬a,
therefore a,¬a  ¬(a ∧ ¬a).
We also know by an instance of axiom ¬1 that
 ¬(a ∧ ¬a)→ ((¬b→ a)→ ((¬b→¬a)→¬¬b))),
then by using modus ponens in the previous line
a,¬a  ((¬b→ a)→ ((¬b→¬a)→¬¬b))),
now we use Pos1 to obtain a,¬a  (¬b→ a),
and modus ponens to obtain  (¬b→¬a)→¬¬b,
we also have a,¬a  (¬b→ a).
then a,¬a  ¬¬b,
using Cω2, ¬¬b  b.
Finally, we have a,¬a  b.
This last line shows that paraconsistency does not hold.  
3.1 De Morgan laws and C1
As we said before, the De Morgan laws are relevant properties which are desirable
in any logic. Cω, P2 and Z fail to satisfy at least one of this laws. We explore these
laws in the context of C1. First, we prove that De Morgan law ¬A∨¬B → ¬(A∧B)
is not provable in C1.
Theorem 3.4 The De Morgan law ¬A ∨ ¬B → ¬(A ∧B) does not hold in C1.
Proof. If we put B as ¬A in the formula ¬A ∨ ¬B → ¬(A ∧ B) we obtain ¬A ∨
¬¬A → ¬(A ∧ ¬A) and then by using axiom Cω1 and Modus Ponens we obtain
¬(A ∧ ¬A) = A◦, and from this and theorem 2.1.5 in [6] we obtain classical logic.
This contradicts the paraconsistency of C1.  
As a consequence, we have three easy statements. The ﬁrst one is a well known
fact.
Corollary 3.5 C1 has the following properties:
(i) C1 is not Classical logic.
(ii) If we add ¬A ∨ ¬B → ¬(A ∧ B) as an axiom of C1, the resulting logic is
Classical logic.
(iii) If we add ¬A ∨ ¬B → ¬(A ∧B) as an axiom of C1, paraconsistency does not
hold any longer.
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∧ 0 1 2
0 0 0 0
1 0 2 2
2 0 2 2
∨ 0 1 2
0 0 2 2
1 2 2 1
2 2 2 2
→ 0 1 2
0 2 2 2
1 0 2 2
2 0 2 2
x ¬x
0 2
1 1
2 0
Table 3
∧ 0 1 2
0 0 0 0
1 0 2 2
2 0 2 2
∨ 0 1 2
0 0 2 2
1 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
→ 0 1 2
0 2 2 2
1 0 2 2
2 0 2 2
x ¬x
0 2
1 1
2 0
Table 4
∧ 0 1 2
0 0 0 0
1 0 2 2
2 0 2 2
∨ 0 1 2
0 0 1 2
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
→ 0 1 2
0 2 2 2
1 0 2 2
2 0 2 2
x ¬x
0 2
1 2
2 0
Table 5
3.2 Extending C1 with De Morgan axioms.
We start by extending C1 with some of the De Morgan laws that are consistent with
paraconsistency in the context of the axioms that deﬁne C1.
Theorem 3.6 It is possible to add to C1 any of the two following axioms or both
of them at the same time to obtain three diﬀerent paraconsistent extensions of C1.
D1:¬(A ∨B) → (¬A ∧ ¬B),
D2:(¬A ∧ ¬B) → ¬(A ∨B).
Proof. We split the proof in four steps:
(i) Table 3 shows a three-valued logic with 1 and 2 as designated values, where the
axioms of C1 are tautologies and none of the axioms D1 and D2 is a tautology.
(ii) Table 4 shows a three-valued logic with 1 and 2 as designated values, where
the axioms of C1 are tautologies and the axiom D1 is a tautology but axiom
D2 is not a tautology.
(iii) Table 5 shows a three-valued logic with 1 and 2 as designated values, where the
axioms of C1 are tautologies and the axiom D2 is also a tautology but axiom
D1 is not a tautology.
(iv) Table 6 shows a three-valued logic with 1 and 2 as designated values, where
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∧ 0 1 2
0 0 0 0
1 0 2 2
2 0 2 2
∨ 0 1 2
0 0 1 2
1 1 1 2
2 2 2 2
→ 0 1 2
0 2 2 2
1 0 2 2
2 0 2 2
x ¬x
0 2
1 2
2 0
Table 6
∧ 0 1 2
0 0 0 0
1 0 2 2
2 0 2 2
∨ 0 1 2
0 0 2 2
1 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
→ 0 1 2
0 0 2 2
1 2 2 2
2 0 2 2
x ¬x
0 2
1 2
2 0
Table 7
the axioms of C1 are tautologies and the axioms D1 and D2 are tautologies.

3.3 Other ways of extending C1
Now we search for more paraconsistent extensions of C1 by adding as axioms to C1
some formulas that express interesting properties and that are valid in a more gen-
eral form in classical logic. These formulas are A1:¬¬A → (¬A → B), A2:¬¬(A →
B) → (¬¬A → ¬¬B) and A3:¬¬(A∧B) ↔ (¬¬A∧¬¬B). In particular A1 (week
explosion principle) is equivalent to the formula (¬A → ¬B) ↔ (¬¬B → ¬¬A)
(weak contrapositive) in any paraconsistent logic that extends Cω, as is the case of
Z, G′3 and P − four [19,2].
Now we add axioms A1 and A2 to C1.
Theorem 3.7 C1 can be extended by adding formula A1 or formula A2 or both
as axioms to obtain three diﬀerent paraconsistent extensions of C1.
Proof.
We show three truth tables for the connectives of three-valued logics with 1 and
2 as designated values.
(i) In the ﬁrst one, table 7, all axioms of C1 as well as A1 are tautologies, but A2
is not a tautology.
(ii) In the second one, table 8, all axioms of C1 as well as A2 are tautologies, but
A1 is not a tautology.
(iii) In the third one, table 9, all the axioms for C1 as well as A1 and A2 are
tautologies.
This shows that adding axiom A1 or axiom A2 or both to C1, we obtain three
diﬀerent paraconsitent logics stronger than C1.  
M. Osorio et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 315 (2015) 47–60 55
∧ 0 1 2
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1
2 0 1 1
∨ 0 1 2
0 0 1 2
1 2 1 1
2 2 2 2
→ 0 1 2
0 1 1 2
1 0 1 2
2 0 2 2
x ¬x
0 1
1 0
2 2
Table 8
∧ 0 1 2
0 0 0 0
1 0 2 2
2 0 2 2
∨ 0 1 2
0 0 2 2
1 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
→ 0 1 2
0 2 2 2
1 0 2 2
2 0 1 2
x ¬x
0 2
1 2
2 0
Table 9
∧ 0 1 2
0 0 0 0
1 0 2 2
2 0 2 2
∨ 0 1 2
0 0 2 2
1 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
→ 0 1 2
0 2 2 2
1 0 2 2
2 0 2 2
x ¬x
0 2
1 1
2 0
Table 10
∧ 0 1 2
0 0 0 0
1 0 2 2
2 0 2 2
∨ 0 1 2
0 0 2 2
1 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
→ 0 1 2
0 2 2 2
1 0 2 2
2 0 2 2
x ¬x
0 2
1 2
2 0
Table 11
Corollary 3.8 None of the three extensions presented in the previous theorem is
P2.
Proof. In P2 the formula A → ¬¬A is a theorem which together with formula A1
leads to A → (¬A → B) which contradicts the property of paraconsistency.  
Theorem 3.9 C1 can be extended to a paraconsistent logic by adding axiom A3.
Proof. We show two truth tables for the connectives of three-valued logics with 1
and 2 as designated values.
(i) In the ﬁrst one, table 10, all axioms of C1 and also A3 are tautologies.
(ii) In the second one, table 11, all axioms of C1 are tautologies but A3 is not.
This shows that by adding axiom A3 to C1, we obtain a paraconsistent extension
of C1.  
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∧ 0 1 2
0 0 0 0
1 0 2 2
2 0 2 2
∨ 0 1 2
0 0 1 2
1 1 1 2
2 2 2 2
→ 0 1 2
0 2 2 2
1 0 2 2
2 0 2 2
x ¬x
0 2
1 2
2 0
Table 12
∧ 0 1 2
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1
2 0 1 1
∨ 0 1 2
0 0 1 2
1 1 1 1
2 2 1 2
→ 0 1 2
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
2 0 2 2
x ¬x
0 1
1 0
2 2
Table 13
∧ 0 1 2
0 0 0 0
1 0 2 2
2 0 2 2
∨ 0 1 2
0 0 1 2
1 1 1 2
2 2 2 2
→ 0 1 2
0 2 2 2
1 0 2 2
2 0 1 2
x ¬x
0 2
1 2
2 0
Table 14
Theorem 3.10 The three systems consisting of the axioms of
• C1 plus formula D1, D2 and A1,
• C1 plus formula D1, D2 and A2, and
• C1 plus formula D1, D2, A1 and A2
are diﬀerent paraconsistent extensions of C1.
Proof. We present three truth tables for the connectives of three-valued logics with
1 and 2 as designated values.
(i) In the ﬁrst one, table 12, all axioms of C1 and also D1, D2 and A1 are
tautologies but A2 is not.
(ii) In the second one, table 13, all axioms of C1 and also D1, D2 and A2 are
tautologies but A1 is not.
(iii) In the third one, table 14, all axioms of C1 and also D1, D2, A1 and A2 are
tautologies.
This shows that we have three diﬀerent paraconsistent extensions of C1.  
Proposition 3.11 There is no three-valued logic for which the axiomatic system
consisting of the axioms of C1 plus D1, D2, A1, A2 and A3 is sound.
The next results are easy to prove.
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Proposition 3.12 Other comments we can make about the extensions of C1 in
relation to the formula A → ¬¬A are:
• The logic that results from adding the formula A → ¬¬A as an axiom to the
system C1, has formulas A2 and A3 as theorems.
• There is not three valued logic for which
(i) all axioms of C1, formula A2 and formula A3 are tautologies and
(ii) the formula A → ¬¬A is not a tautology.
Figure 1 shows two ways of extending C1, one leads to Cive and the other one
contains logics that have D2 as a theorem. We recall that D2 is not a theorem in
Cive [19].
C1
C1+ C1+D1+D2
Cive C1+D1+D2+A1 C1+D1+D2+A2 C1+D1+D2+A3
C1+D1+D2+A1+A2
Fig. 1. Two ways of extending C1
Proposition 3.13 D1, A2 and A3 are theorems in Cive, A1 is not.
4 Conclusion
It is well known that Classical logic is very useful in applications related to Artiﬁ-
cial Intelligence. In this paper we analyse diﬀerent paraconsistent logics and their
proximity with to Classical Logic. As we know, the substitution theorem is a prop-
erty that meets Classical Logic and it is desirable that a logic that approximates
Classical Logic satisﬁes it. In this paper we show that any paraconsistent logic that
extends paraconsistent logic C1 does not satisfy the substitution theorem. On the
other hand, we also know that the De Morgan laws are relevant properties which
are valid in Classical Logic, then we shown diﬀerent paraconsistent extensions of C1
where some of the De Morgan laws are valid.
At the end of this paper, we also present paraconsistent extensions of C1 obtained
by adding as axioms to C1 some formulas that express interesting properties and
that are valid in a more general form in classical logic, such as the week explosion
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principle, the weak contrapositive property, etc. We consider that having diﬀerent
paraconsistent extensions, each of them close to classical logic, would allow Artiﬁcial
Intelligence developers to select the one that according to its properties is best
suitable for the desired application.
We use three valued logics to support our claims. We have also presented a
diagram to show diﬀerent ways of extending C1 to other paraconsistent logics. Be-
sides the problem of discovering new paraconsistent logics, there is the problem of
deciding which of them is a maximal paraconsistent logic. Exploring diﬀerent para-
consistent logics and solving the problem of maximality for each of them is part of
our future work.
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